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Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing
Abstract
In recent years, online retailers (e-tailers) have started allowing manufacturers direct access to
their customers while charging a fee for providing this access, a format commonly referred to as
agency selling. In this paper, we use a stylized theoretical model to answer a key question that
e-tailers are facing: When should they use an agency selling format instead of using the more con-
ventional reselling format? We nd that agency selling is more ecient than reselling and leads to
lower retail prices; however, the e-tailers end up giving control over retail prices to the manufacturer.
Therefore, the reaction by the manufacturer, who makes electronic channel pricing decisions based
on their impact on demand in the traditional channel (brick-and-mortar retailing), is an important
factor for e-tailers to consider. We nd that when sales in the electronic channel lead to a negative
eect on demand in the traditional channel, e-tailers prefer agency selling, whereas when sales in
the electronic channel lead to substantial stimulation of demand in the traditional channel, e-tailers
prefer reselling. This preference is mediated by competition between e-tailers|as competition be-
tween them increases, e-tailers prefer to use agency selling. We also nd that when e-tailers benet
from positive externalities from the sales of the focal product (such as additional prots from sales
of associated products), retail prices may be lower under reselling than under agency selling, and the
e-tailers prefer reselling under some conditions for which they would prefer agency selling without
the positive externalities.
Keywords: multi-channel retailing, electronic commerce, distribution channel, cross-channel spillovers,
agency model, retail competition, game theory.
1 Introduction
Online retailing has witnessed strong growth in the last decade, and US online retail sales were reported
to be $290 billion in 2013, accounting for 9% of total US retail sales (Sehgal, 2014). Online retailers
(also called \e-tailers") have primarily been resellers (i.e., e-tailers purchase from manufacturers and
resell to consumers online). More recently, US e-tailers such as Amazon (through Amazon Marketplace)
and Sears (through Marketplace at Sears) have broken away from the traditional reselling format and
embraced the agency model. Indeed, in recent years, a large fraction of Amazon's sales and revenue
have come from its Marketplace (Amazon, 2014). Prominent online retailers in other countries have also
adopted agency selling, such as Taobao in China (Bonls, 2012) and Flipkart in India (Tiwari, 2014).
Under this selling format, e-tailers allow manufacturers (or, more generally, upstream agents) direct
access to customers through the retailing website for a fee, and manufacturers make decisions regarding
key factors such as retail prices without making investments in retail space or e-commerce websites.
Increased transparency in factors such as retail prices has led many manufacturers and content
producers to enthusiastically adopt the agency selling format: book publishers such as Macmillan and
Random House, and magazines such as The New Yorker, have started using Kindle and iPad extensively
for distribution of their content, and app and game developers use the Android-based mobile devices
and iPhone to reach out to their consumers. Nevertheless, although agency selling is becoming more
popular, we observe that reselling continues to prevail as the dominant selling format in some mature
digital industries such as music. In this research, we study dierent factors that aect the choice of
selling format across dierent industries in the online context.
A key distinction between the reselling and agency selling formats is who sets the retail prices| in
agency selling the retail prices are decided by the manufacturer, whereas in reselling they are decided by
the e-tailer,|and we focus on this distinction in this paper. More specically, in the reselling format,
the e-tailer buys goods from the manufacturer at a wholesale price and sets the retail price in the market
(as practiced by Amazon for many of its products, iTunes and Soap.com, among others). In the agency
selling format, the manufacturer sells directly to consumers on the retailer's marketplace and sets the
retail price, but needs to share a certain fraction of the revenues with the e-tailer for providing the
access (as practiced by Amazon Marketplace, Kindle, iBook Store and Alice, among others).
Online retailing is still in ux, and as it grows over time and increasingly inuences traditional
retailing, it is important to understand which selling formats will be adopted by competing e-tailers.
Interestingly, online retailers have been the primary architects of the e-channel as opposed to manufac-
turers in brick-and-mortar channel. Some analysts attribute this to the bargaining power they command
in the e-channel due to large customer bases that span several geographies (Carr, 2012). Even though
the existence of dierent selling formats in online retailing is a conspicuous phenomenon, the under-
standing of this phenomenon is limited. Our aim in this paper is to develop a deeper understanding
of online retail formats, which can guide e-tailers in making the choice between using the historically
dominant reselling format, and the agency selling format.
A key factor that plays a role in determining the selling format in online retailing is the degree
of competition among e-tailers. Furthermore, in a multi-channel retailing environment, sales in one
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channel may have an impact on sales in another channel. Several empirical studies suggest that sales
in the electronic channel have a negative eect on sales in the traditional brick-and-mortar channel
(Brynjolfsson et al. (2009) and Goolsbee (2001) show this for apparel and computers, respectively).
Other studies suggest that the e-channel not only gives access to new consumers, but also has a strong
stimulation eect on demand in the traditional channel (Smith and Telang (2010) and Mortimer et al.
(2012) show this for media, such as movies and music). Yet other studies suggest that eect of e-channel
sales on traditional channel can be positive but small (Hilton and Wiley (2010) show this for books).
Such cross-channel eects impact the manufacturer's aggregate prot from the two channels. In the
presence of spillovers between channels, dierent selling formats in online retailing will induce dierent
strategic reactions from the manufacturer, because they will lead to dierent levels of sales in the e-
channel which will impact the manufacturer's sales in the traditional channel. Moreover, these reactions
from the manufacturer will aect the e-tailer's protability as well. Therefore, when the e-tailers decide
their selling formats, they will consider the reactions from the manufacturer under dierent kinds of
spillovers. Essentially, dierent selling formats lead to dierent degrees of channel eciency and pricing
power for various players, the impact of which on players' prots varies with the type of spillover. The
equilibrium market structure is a result of the complex interactions among these factors. We build a
parsimonious game theory model that captures these drivers and sheds light on the reselling versus
agency selling issue.
Our results show that if the e-channel has a negative cross-eect on demand in the traditional
channel, it is optimal for the e-tailers to adopt the agency selling agreement. On the other hand, if the
e-channel has a strong positive cross-eect on demand in the traditional channel, the e-tailers prefer to
adopt the reselling agreement. These results are directionally consistent with the retailing agreements
we observe in dierent industries, as we discuss later. We also nd that as the intensity of competition
among e-tailers increases, they prefer agency selling over reselling. We also show that agency selling is
benecial for consumers as prices are lower under agency selling and consumer surplus is higher.
In our main analysis, we assume that the e-retailers' decisions are driven purely by the objective
of maximizing prots from the sale of products from the manufacturer. However, in some situations,
the e-tailers' decisions might also be driven by other considerations such as positive externalities from
sales of complementary products. An example of this is an e-tailer that sells e-books and also sells
compatible e-readers (e.g., Amazon sells both e-books and the e-reader Kindle), and higher e-book sales
also motivate higher e-reader sales. In other words, there is a positive externality from e-book sales,
and the e-tailer may have the incentive to increase e-book sales by lowering their price at the cost
of sacricing some of the prot from e-books. On incorporating positive externalities from sales into
the model, we nd that retail prices may be lower under reselling than under agency selling (which
is contrary to the result from the main model). We also nd that the e-tailers prefer reselling under
some conditions where they would prefer agency selling without the positive externalities. This oers
an explanation for why, around the year 2010 when Amazon was selling the e-reader Kindle at a high
price, it was using the reselling arrangement and was selling e-books even below the wholesale price at
which it purchased them from publishers (Rich, 2009).
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Our research is closely related to three streams of literature: (i) interactions between the Internet
and traditional channels, (ii) retail competition within a channel, and (iii) platforms and two-sided
markets. We now describe how our research relates to the literature in the these areas.
A growing stream of literature looks at the interactions between traditional and electronic channels.
Balasubramanian (1998) models a horizontally-dierentiated traditional channel and analyzes how this
channel changes in the presence of an Internet retailer. He shows that the e-tailer acts as a wedge
between the competing retailers and the retailers compete with the e-tailer instead of competing with
each other. Yoo and Lee (2011) extend the Balasubramanian model to account for heterogeneous
customer preferences for the e-channel, and show that introduction of the e-channel does not necessarily
intensify competition, a result contrary to common intuition. Chiang et al. (2003) and Zettelmeyer
(2000) suggest that a manufacturer can directly sell through the e-channel to improve its bargaining
position versus a traditional retailer. These papers focus on the impact on the traditional market due to
the introduction of the electronic channel. Our research diers in two distinct ways. First, we focus on
the equilibrium selling formats in electronic retailing in the presence of interactions with the traditional
channel, as opposed to focusing on the eect of e-channel introduction on traditional retail. Second,
most research in this area assumes that the e-channel cannibalizes sales from the traditional channel.
Noting that several studies show that sales in the e-channel can also stimulate demand in the traditional
channel, we extend the analytical literature in this area by analyzing the impact on selling formats in the
e-channel under both positive and negative spillovers from the e-channel into the traditional channel.
Our work is also related to the rich stream of literature on the determinants of vertical channel struc-
ture (McGuire and Staelin, 1983, Bernheim and Whinston, 1985, Bonanno and Vickers, 1988, Moorthy,
1988, Coughlan and Wernerfelt, 1989). Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989) and Moorthy (1988) focus on
the equilibrium channel structure when the manufacturers are the architects of the channel. Recent
work in channels has been motivated by the observation that retailers are increasingly gaining greater
power in the channel (Iyer and Villas-Boas, 2003, Raju and Zhang, 2005, Geylani et al., 2006). Jerath
and Zhang (2010) study the equilibrium channel structure when a monopolistic retailer is the architect
of the channel. Specically, they study when a traditional retailer allows manufacturers to set up stores
within a store (which can be considered as the brick-and-mortar analogue to online marketplaces). Our
research, however, focuses on competing retailers and inter-channel spillovers, which is important in a
multi-channel setting. Various other papers analyze contracts in channels assuming the channel struc-
ture to be exogenous (Cachon and Kok, 2010, Choi, 1991, Desai et al., 2004, Jeuland and Shugan, 1983,
Iyer, 1998).
A key question that we address in this paper is: When should an e-tailer use agency selling? This is
related to the nascent literature on platform retailing (Jiang et al., 2011, Kwark et al., 2012, Hagiu and
Wright, 2014), as the e-tailer is essentially functioning as a platform on which manufacturers interact
directly with consumers and pay the e-tailer a fee. Jiang et al. (2011) consider the phenomenon of
strategic underselling by agents selling on platforms under the threat of being replaced by the platform
owner, while we study a completely dierent problem|when will a platform structure be adopted in
an electronic market. Kwark et al. (2012) study the dierent roles online reviews play under reselling
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versus agency selling in vertically dierentiated market. Online reviews increase upstream competition
in case of reselling and benet the retailer, but put a downward pressure on prices under agency selling
and hurt the retailer. Hagiu and Wright (2014) nd that whether the marketplace or the reseller
mode is preferred depends on whether independent suppliers or the intermediary have more important
information relevant to the optimal tailoring of marketing activities for each specic product.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our model. In Section 3, we
analyze the dierent selling formats that are possible, and derive the equilibrium formats that emerge
in the e-channel under dierent conditions. In Section 4, we consider several extensions of the basic
model; in one of these extensions, we include positive externalities from sales (in addition to direct prot
from sales) in the objective functions of the e-tailers. In Section 5, we conclude with a discussion and
suggestions for future work.
2 Model
We consider a manufacturer (M) who sells a product on the electronic channel (E) through two sym-
metric \pure play" electronic retailers (e-tailer X and e-tailer Y). Pure play implies that retailers only
have an electronic/online presence. In the rest of the paper, we refer to the manufacturer as \him" and
to the e-tailers as \her."
2.1 Channel Structures
Dierent market congurations are possible in this setting based on the contractual agreements between
the manufacturer and the e-tailers. An e-tailer can enter into a reselling agreement (denoted by R) with
the manufacturer, in which case the e-tailer purchases the product from the manufacturer at a xed
wholesale price and decides the retail price for the consumer. This is similar to the selling format that is
commonly used in brick-and-mortar retailing. Alternately, the e-tailer can enter into an agency selling
agreement (denoted by A) and allow the manufacturer to sell its products directly to consumers. In
this arrangement, the manufacturer determines the retail price but has to pay the e-tailer a fraction
, 0    1, of its revenues as fee for accessing her customers. Such a fee structure is used by many
online marketplaces, e.g., Amazon Marketplace, Travelocity, Alice, iPhone App Store, iBook Store and
Kindle.1 Note that, the key distinction between the two arrangements that we focus on is whether the
manufacturer or the retailer has the ability to decide price.2
1In addition to the percentage fee, marketplace providers sometimes charge the sellers a small xed fee as well. For
instance, Amazon Marketplace charges a small fee of $39 per month to sellers who want to sell regularly over a long time
horizon on its marketplace. This fee gives the sellers access to certain infrastructure services such as easy interfaces for
uploading and displaying product information. Note that, because even small professional sellers have monthly sales much
higher than many thousands of dollars, this small fee is, in all probability, not levied as part of a two-part tari with the
intent of coordinating the channel.
2There are other distinctions that we do not consider in this paper. For instance, who provides service and how much,
and whether the service provided is observable, is an important issue (Jerath and Zhang, 2010, Jiang et al., 2011). Another
important distinction, related to logistical issues, is that under reselling the e-tailer owns the inventory and is responsible for
order fulllment, whereas under agency selling the manufacturer owns the inventory and is responsible for order fulllment.
While this may not be important in the case of information goods because delivery is virtually costless, it may be important
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The e-tailers independently and simultaneously choose either the reselling or the agency selling
format. We endow the e-tailers with the power to make this decision because online retailers have
large customer bases and extensive reach which oers them substantial power in determining the selling
format that they want to use. Note, however, that in making these decisions the e-tailers will consider
the subsequent reactions that they expect from the manufacturer. The e-tailers' decisions lead to three
possible congurations in the market:
1. RR | Both e-tailers are resellers; we name this the \wholesale" conguration.
2. RA | E-tailer X chooses to sell the product as a reseller and e-tailer Y enters into an agency
selling arrangement with the manufacturer; we name this the \hybrid" conguration. Note that
the RA and AR arrangements are the same as the e-tailers are indistinguishable.
3. AA | Both e-tailers enter into agency selling agreements with the manufacturer; we name this
the \agency" conguration.
2.2 Demand Specication
Electronic Channel
We assume the two e-tailers are symmetric and dierentiated, and face a linear demand system given
by:
qX =
1
1 + 
  1
1  2 pX +

1  2 pY ; qY =
1
1 + 
  1
1  2 pY +

1  2 pX ; (1)
where qi is the quantity of the product sold at e-tailer i and pi is the retail price charged by e-tailer
i, i 2 fX;Y g.3 Linear demand models have been used in the marketing and economics literatures
previously to model dierentiated duopolies (Shubik and Levitan, 1980, Singh and Vives, 1984, Raju
el al., 1995, Jerath and Zhang, 2010).4 The demand system above gives us a model of partial competition
where  2 [0; 1) is the parameter that captures the degree of dierentiation between the two e-tailers.
If  = 0, utilities from the products are independent, and both retailers act as monopolies in their
in the case of physical goods because delivery entails a cost. We do not model this distinction between the two contractual
agreements in our model and assume that fulllment entails a costless transfer to the consumer, an assumption invoked in
most previous studies on channels. We also note that sometimes variations of these basic selling formats are used, which
do not have a signicant impact on the basic forces at play. For instance, in a variation on reselling, e-tailers may decide
the retail price and negotiate with manufacturers on percentage fees that the manufacturers will get per sale (instead of
a wholesale price). Similarly, in a variation of agency selling, the manufacturers, while setting retail prices, do not have
complete freedom and can only choose one of dierent pre-set pricing levels.
3Note that the demand system above can be rewritten in terms of the price dierential between e-tailers X and Y as
qX =
1
1+
  1
1+
pX +

1 2 (pY   pX); qY = 11+   11+ pY + 1 2 (pX   pY ).
4This demand specication follows from the quadratic consumption utility of a representative consumer which is given
by U(qX ; qY ) = qX + qY   (q2X + q2Y + 2qXqY )=2. This is a special case of the quadratic utility function in Shubik and
Levitan (1980). Similar quadratic utility functions have been used in Singh and Vives (1984), Raju el al. (1995) and
Jerath and Zhang (2010). This utility function for a representative consumer assumes that positive non-integer amounts
of each product may be consumed. As pointed out in Dixit and Stiglitz (1979) and Anderson et al. (1992), this type of a
formulation for a representative consumer can be consistent with a formulation in which every individual consumer in the
population consumes zero or one unit of one product. Therefore, our formulation is appropriate for a digital goods setting
(in which, generally speaking, consumers may purchase only one unit of a digital good such as an e-book or a digital copy
of a song).
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respective markets. As  increase, downstream competition in the market becomes more intense. If
 ! 1, the products are fully substitutable and the market becomes perfectly competitive. Intermediate
values of  represent dierent degrees of dierentiation.
We use this particular demand specication because it has the folloowing two desirable character-
istics|as the dierentiation increases (i.e., value of  decreases), the sensitivity to price, 1=(1   2),
decreases (consistent with the intuition that customers are less price sensitive for more dierentiated
products), and the size of the total potential market, 2=(1 + ), increases (consistent with the intuition
that more dierentiated products reach a wider customer base). We have also considered other popular
demand systems, such as the formulation qi = 1  pi+ (pj   pi); i; j 2 fX;Y g;  > 0. This formulation
was used in Raju el al. (1995) and has the feature that, on changing , the degree of dierentiation
between the products changes whereas the total market size remains constant. We nd that our results
stay qualitatively the same under this alternative demand formulation. (More details of the analysis
are available in the Appendix.)
The dierentiation between the e-tailers comes from a combination of what is sold and where it
is sold, and one or both of these factors may be operative. For instance, even if the manufacturer
sells the same product through the e-tailers, goods can still be dierentiated from the perspective of a
consumer because of various other factors at play. For example, the experience of reading an e-book
on the iPad is very dierent from the experience of reading the same e-book on the Kindle, and this
can aect consumers' preference for (and substitutability between) Apple or Amazon even though the
content of the e-book stays the same. We note that this is based on horizontal dierentiation, not
vertical dierentiation, as at the same price not all consumers will agree that one is better than the
other. More broadly, dierentiation between e-tailers could arise due to website layout, inertia, loyalty
and membership programs, other products oered by the e-tailers, etc. Based on how salient these
dierences are from the consumers' perspective, the e-tailers might compete very aggressively or not so
aggressively.
The total demand for the manufacturer through the electronic channel is given by qE = qX + qY .
We assume that the manufacturer can reach the consumers in this electronic market only through these
e-tailers, i.e., we rule out the possibility that the manufacturer sets up a direct electronic channel, as
direct selling is a dicult proposition for most manufacturers.
Traditional Channel
There is an existing (traditional) retail channel where the manufacturer sells goods at a per-unit price
normalized to $1, and faces a base demand Q in the absence of the electronic channel. It is important to
note that we do not assume that the manufacturer necessarily sells identical products through the two
channels; he may sell the same product or dierent products through the two channels. For example,
a publisher of books may sell e-books through the online channel and print books (same and dierent
titles) through the traditional channel. Similarly, a music producer or artist may sell individual mp3
tracks online, and sell album CDs, concert tickets and airplay rights oine.
The sales of the product in the traditional channel are aected by the sales in the new electronic
6
Figure 1: Market structure: Interaction of the e-channel with traditional retail.
channel. We model this by assuming that sales in the traditional channel are now Q + qE , where qE
denotes the total sales in the e-channel, and the parameter  captures the net overall cross-channel
eect that the e-channel imposes on sales through the existing channel. More specically,  represents
the net change in oine sales for every unit sold online. In our analysis, we consider  2 [ 1; 1].5 This
formulation models, in a reduced-form way, an increase ( > 0), or decrease ( < 0), or no eect ( = 0)
in traditional sales due to every unit sold through the e-channel. Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram
explaining the cross-channel eect.
We assume a unidirectional and exogenous cross-channel eect for simplicity. In Section 4.3, we
extend the model to incorporate endogenous consumer choice across the electronic and traditional
channels, and show that our results remain qualitatively the same.
 > 0 implies a positive cross-eect, i.e., every sale in the e-channel leads to  units of increased
sales in the traditional channel. One factor driving this increase could be word-of-mouth, e.g., when a
consumer purchases an e-book on the Kindle and discusses it with his friends, they might buy the print
version of the book from a bookstore. Hilton and Wiley (2010) nd that availability of e-books leads to
a moderate increase in the sales of print books, indicating that  might be positive and small/moderate
for books. For media products, such as movies and music, we see strong evidence of positive externalities
(Smith and Telang, 2010). For example, positive cross-eects are present in the music industry in which
several independent artists and, more recently, popular bands such as Coldplay, even give away their
music online for free to promote concert attendance and generate demand for airplay. On the other hand,
various studies also nd that, in certain cases, the online channel has a negative cross-eect on sales
through the traditional channel, i.e.,  < 0. This might be attributed to cannibalization, i.e., consumers
who buy online are less likely to go into stores to buy the product, which could happen for consumer
packaged goods sold at online stores like Soap.com and Alice (Brynjolfsson et al., 2009, Goolsbee, 2001).
In summary, dierent studies show that cross-eects can be negative or positive (or absent) in dierent
cases. Our model is exible enough to capture all of these cross-eects and understand their implications
on the selling formats that will result in the e-channel. Note that many dierent factors may be at play
5For  <  1, in our model, the negative externality imposed is so strong that the manufacturer would not want to sell
through the electronic channel at all. Since this is an uninteresting scenario, we do not consider  < 1.
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simultaneously in determining the aggregate eect of how demand in dierent channels interacts in
a multi-channel scenario.6 Our reduced-form way of modeling cross-eects is meant to capture the
aggregate cross-channel eect. Future research can look into the impact of dierent factors in isolation
by micro-modeling them.
In our basic model, we also assume for simplicity that the impact on demand in the traditional
channel from sales on the e-channel does not inuence prices in the traditional channel. This can be
due to several reasons. One reason is that the baseline demand, Q, is suciently high compared to
the magnitude of the spillover, and therefore prices are not inuenced much (in support of this, note
that online sales only account for about 9% of total retail sales). Other reasons can be high menu
costs, established reference prices and operational reasons. For example, the prices of print books have
remained largely unaected by e-book pricing. One could argue that this is due to a combination of
historically-established reference prices in the minds of consumers as well as operational diculties (e.g.,
prices are printed on books and can't be changed with frequent changes in e-book prices). Nevertheles,
in Section 4.2, we relax this assumption and show that the qualitative nature of the ndings do not
change when the prices in the traditional channel are chosen endogenously.
Given the above, the prot of the manufacturer depends on the prot from the e-channel, sales on
the traditional channel and the spillover eects of the e-channel on the traditional channel, and is given
by
M = 1:( Q+ qE) + ME ;
where qE is the total demand in the electronic channel and ME is the manufacturer's prot from
the electronic channel which depends on the e-channel structure|RR, RA or AA. Therefore, the
manufacturer will react to the selling format in the e-channel, and the e-tailers have to consider this
reaction while making their selling format decisions. A summary of notation used is presented in Table 1.
Finally, note that the insights from our model can be used to inform other multi-channel situations
with cross-channel eects. However, using agency selling makes our model fairly specic to electronic
channels since agency selling is not typical in other scenarios. Therefore, any extensions to other
scenarios should be done with this caveat in mind.
3 Analysis
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes under the three congurations of the e-
channel|RR, RA and AA. Following this, we derive which of these congurations will be observed in
equilibrium for dierent combinations of values of market competition () and cross-channel eect (),
and the impact on dierent market players of the resulting arrangement. We also derive insights for
setting agency fees by e-tailers.
6The dierent factors at play simultaneously may include demand expansion after a new channel is introduced, a
segment of consumers switching between channels due to price dierences, and dierent products being oered on dierent
channels (e.g., e-books through the e-channel and collector's editions through the traditional channel; music singles through
the e-channel and album CDs, concert tickets and airplay rights through the other channel).
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Notation Meaning
 e-channel competition
 spillover eect into traditional channel
pX ; pY prices charged at the e-tailers
qX ; qY demand at the e-tailers
X ; Y prots of the e-tailers
ME prot of the manufacturer from the e-channel
M total prot of the manufacturer
RR, RA, AA e-channel congurations
X ; Y fees charged by the e-tailers in the agency selling format
wRR,w

RA equilibriumwholesale prices in the RR and RA congurations
AA; 

RA equilibriumfees charged by the e-tailers in the AA and RA congurations
Table 1: Notation
3.1 Analysis of Dierent Congurations in the E-Channel
3.1.1 Electronic Channel with Two Resellers (RR)
In this conguration, both e-tailers purchase the product at a xed wholesale price from the manu-
facturer and then set retail prices. The timing of this subgame is as follows. First, the manufacturer
decides the wholesale price it will charge to both e-tailers.7 The e-tailers then individually decide if they
wish to accept this wholesale price or choose an outside option (which we normalize to zero). If the
e-tailers accept, they set the retail prices. This arrangement is illustrated in Figure 2(a). The prots of
the manufacturer and the two e-tailers are as follow:
RRM = 1:( Q+ qE)| {z }
prots from traditional channel
+w(qX + qY )| {z }
prots from
; RRi = qi(pi   w); i 2 fX;Y g; (2)
where w is the wholesale price, pi is the price charged by e-tailer i and qi is the quantity sold by e-tailer
i. We solve this subgame using backward induction. The equilibrium prices and quantities under this
conguration are as follow:
wRR =
1  
2
; pRRX = p
RR
Y =
3  2   
2(2  ) ; q
RR
X = q
RR
Y =
1 + 
2(2  )(1 + ) :
Note that the wholesale price decreases linearly with the spillover eect. This is because, if  is negative,
then more sales in the e-channel will decrease sales in the traditional channel, and the manufacturer
keeps wholesale price high to induce high retail prices and sell less in the e-channel. As  increases and
7We check that the manufacturer benets from selling to both e-tailers as opposed to selling to only one of them.
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Figure 2: Schematic diagrams showing the RR, RA and AA channel structures for the e-channel. M
represents the manufacturer and X and Y represent the e-tailers. The direction of the arrow points
away from the player making the decision. A dashed line indicates that the list price at an e-tailer in
case of agency selling is decided by the manufacturer.
becomes positive, the eects are reversed and the manufacturer wants to increase sales in the e-channel
by charging a low wholesale price to induce low retail prices. The equilibrium payos are as follow:
RRM =
(1 + )2
2(2  )(1 + ) ; 
RR
ME =
1  2
2(2  )(1 + ) ; 
RR
i =
(1  )(1 + )2
4(2  )2(1 + ) 8i 2 X;Y :
It is easy to see that both RRM and 
RR
i are convex and increasing in  whereas 
RR
ME is concave in 
and achieves a maximum when  = 0.
3.1.2 Electronic Channel with One Reseller and One Agency Seller (RA)
In this conguration, one of the e-tailers uses agency selling and the other e-tailer sells as a reseller.
First, the e-tailer willing to enter into an agency selling agreement announces the agency fee, , which
is the fraction of the revenue she will keep for each item sold through the marketplace. Without
loss of generality, we assume that Y uses agency selling in this conguration. Next, after observing
the agency fee, the manufacturer decides whether he wants to sell through the marketplace or only
through the reseller (we nd that M always sells through the reseller). He simultaneously announces
the wholesale price w for the reseller (X). Following this, X decides the retail price pX that it will charge,
and the manufacturer decides the retail price pY in the marketplace provided by Y. This arrangement
is illustrated in Figure 2(b). (If the timing is changed such that the manufacturer simultaneously
announces the wholesale and retail prices it will charge, the results do not change qualitatively.) If M
decides to sell through both e-tailers his prot is:
RAM = 1:( Q+ qE) + qXw + (1  )qY pY :
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If he decides to sell only through the reseller, we assume that the price in the marketplace is such that
there are no sales through the marketplace.8 In this case, the manufacturer's and the e-tailers' payos
are given by:
RAM = 1:(
Q+ qX) + wqX ; 
RA
X = qX(pX   w); RAY =
8<:qY pY if M sells through Y0 otherwise : (3)
If the manufacturer chooses to sell through both the e-tailers, we observe the following prices in the
electronic channel:
pRAX =
w
 
2(1  ) + 2+ (1  )[(1  )(2 + )   ]
(1  ) (4  2) ; p
RA
Y =
w(3  ) + (1  )[(1  )(2 + )  2 ]
(1  ) (4  2) :
The optimal wholesale price for e-tailer X in this case, conditional on , is given by:
wRA =
(1  )(1  ) (2 + ) (4 +  (2(1  2)  (1  ))) +  (8 + 2(2  ))  (1 + )  8 + (2  )2 	
2 (4 + (1  )((7  )2   8)) ;
which is linearly increasing in  (as in the wholesale case).
If the manufacturer chooses to sell only through the reseller, we observe the following wholesale and
retail prices in the electronic channel:
wRA =
1  
2
; pRAX =
3  
4
:
Note that the optimal wholesale price above is the same as in the wholesale (RR) case.
We nd that, in equilibrium, the manufacturer sells through both e-tailers. We compute the optimal
fee RA numerically over the entire parameter space, as solving for it analytically is challenging. We
observe that the wholesale price in this case is weakly lower than the wholesale prices oered in the
wholesale (RR) case, i.e., wRA  wRR, and the retail prices at both the e-tailers are lower than the
retail prices in the wholesale case, i.e., pRAX ; p
RA
Y  pRRX = pRRY .
3.1.3 Electronic Channel with Two Agency Sellers (AA)
In this conguration, both e-tailers use agency selling. First, the e-tailers announce the fees X and
Y . The manufacturer then decides whether he wants to sell through X or Y or both. Once he decides
which e-tailer he wants to sell through, he decides the retail prices. This arrangement is illustrated in
Figure 2(c). If the manufacturer chooses both e-tailers, his prot can be written as follows:
AAM = 1:(
Q+ qE) + (1  X)qXpX + (1  Y )qY pY :
If the fee charged by an e-tailer is too high, the manufacturer might decide not to use the e-tailer's
marketplace for selling his products. Under this condition, when he chooses to sell only through one
8We model zero sales in the marketplace j(6= i) by setting qj = 0, or 11+   11 2 pj + 1 2 pi = 0) pj = 1   + pi:
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e-tailer (say i), his prots and the e-tailer's prots are:
AAM = 1:(
Q+ qi) + (1  i)qipi; AAi =
8<:iqipi if M sells through i;0 otherwise :
If the manufacturer chooses to sell through both e-tailers, we observe the following retail prices in
the electronic channel:
pAAi =
(1  )

(1  i)2   (1  Aj ) + (1  Ai )(2 + )(1  Aj + )

4(1  Ai )(1  Aj )  (2  Ai   Aj )22
; i; j 2 fX;Y g; i 6= j:
In case the manufacturer wishes to sell only through e-tailer i, we set the quantity sold at the other
e-tailer to zero, i.e., qj = 0, by using a similar treatment as in the hybrid case. The retail price in
marketplace i is then given by:
pi =
1
2

1  
1  i

:
We nd that, in equilibrium, the fees are such that the manufacturer sells through both e-tailers.
There is a unique and symmetric equilibrium in the fees charged by the e-tailers, given by X = Y =
AA, where:
AA = 1 
1
3

(   2) +K1=3 + 
4 + 6   43   32 + 422
K1=3

and K = 3
p
3
p
(1  2) 2 (6 + 23 (5  32)  + 3 (9  112 + 44) 2 + 4 (3  22) 3 + 4)
+6 + 93   65 + 3  3  222 2 +   9  82 3:
The equilibrium prices and quantities as a function of agency fee are as follow:
pAi =
1  AA   
2(1  AA)
; qAi =
1  AA + 
2(1 + )(1  AA)
; 8i 2 fX;Y g: (4)
Note that, after conditioning on the fees, the prices above do not depend directly on the level of market
competition (). This is because the prices for both e-tailers are jointly set by the manufacturer.
We can see from (4) above that  has two eects on the retail prices|a direct eect, and an
indirect eect through AA. The direct eect leads to the reduction of prices as  increases, because
the manufacturer wants to sell more in the e-channel to advantage of the spillover into the traditional
channel. The indirect eect of  manifests itself through AA, which increases or decreases in  under
dierent conditions. When AA increases in  , the indirect eect leads to a further reduction in prices
(beyond the direct eect). This is because a larger fee means that the manufacturer can keep lesser
revenue per unit, so has the incentive to reduce the price. On the other hand, when AA decreases
in  , the indirect eect leads to an increase in prices. This is because a smaller fee means that the
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manufacturer can keep more revenue per unit, so has the incentive to increase the price. In this case,
while the overall eect of  on the prices is a combination of these two eects, the direct eect dominates
the indirect eect and prices always decrease with  . The equilibrium payos for the manufacturer and
the retailers are as follow:
AAM =
Q+
(1  AA + )2
2(1  AA)(1 + )
; AAME =
(1  AA)[(1  AA)2   2]
2(1  AA)(1 + )
;
AAi =
AA[(1  AA)2   2]
4(1  AA)2(1 + )
8i 2 fX;Y g:
 has both a direct and an indirect eect (through AA) on the manufacturer's total prots also. The
direct eect leads to an increase in prots as  increases. However, when AA increases in  , the
manufacturer's prots might actually decrease because he keeps a smaller fraction of the e-channel
revenue. In this case, we observe that the prots are non-monotonic in the spillover.
Quantity Relationship
prices pAAX = p
AA
Y  pRAX ; pRAY  pRRX = pRRY
quantities qRRE  qRAE  qAAE
wholesale prices wRA  wRR
manufacturer's prots RAM  RRM ; AAM
manufacturer's e-channel prots AAE  RRE
Table 2: Comparison of equilibrium outcomes under dierent channel structures
Before we proceed, in Table 2 we present a summary of the relationships between the dierent
equilibrium quantities under the three dierent e-channel structures. To obtain a sense of consumer
welfare under the dierent formats, we compare the prices and quantities sold in the three cases and
observe that under all market conditions, the lowest prices are observed under the agency arrangement,
followed by the hybrid arrangement and the wholesale arrangement has the highest prices. As a result,
highest quantities are sold in the agency arrangement, followed by hybrid and nally by wholesale. The
prices in agency selling are lower (as compared to reselling) because, given , a higher price would mean
more payout to the retailer (eectively, higher marginal cost) as well as lower sales. To counteract this
loss, the manufacturer lowers the price to avoid the high payout to the retailer and achieves higher sales.
3.2 Equilibrium Selling Formats
Using the solutions of the dierent sub-games studied in the previous section, we now solve the rst stage
of the game in which the competing e-tailers determine the selling formats they will adopt. Note that
we assume that selling formats are determined before the pricing decisions (in the subgames) because it
is easier for the manufacturer to change wholesale prices than it is for the e-tailers to change the selling
format. In other words, the decision on the selling format is a longer-term decision than the decision on
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Figure 3: Equilibrium selling format as a function of cross-channel eect () and retail competition ().
wholesale price. This timing is also in accordance with modeling choices in previous papers on vertical
channel structures, e.g., (McGuire and Staelin, 1983, Moorthy, 1988, Jerath and Zhang, 2010). The
following matrix represents the game between the e-tailers in strategic form (where ARX = 
RA
Y and
ARY = 
RA
X ).
E-tailer Y
A R
E-tailer X
A AAX ; 
AA
Y 
AR
X ; 
AR
Y
R RAX ; 
RA
Y 
RR
X ; 
RR
Y
Note that we have only two exogenous parameters| and  . We solve the preceding 2  2 game
for every tuple (; ) to derive the selling formats adopted by the e-tailers in equilibrium. From the e-
tailers' perspectives, dierent formats oer them varying levels of channel eciency and pricing power.
The resulting equilibrium conguration depends on the degree of competition and the cross-channel
spillover. The equilibrium selling formats for all allowable values of  and  are described in the
following proposition and illustrated in Figure 3.
Proposition 1 For any given , both e-tailers prefer agency selling for negative or low positive spillovers,
both e-tailers prefer reselling for high positive spillovers, and one e-tailer prefers agency selling with the
other preferring reselling for medium positive spillovers.
We now discuss the insights behind this pattern. First, dierent selling formats lead to dierent
channel eciency. In reselling, the manufacturer sets the wholesale price, followed by each e-tailer
setting her retail price, which leads to the problem of double marginalization. In agency selling, where
a percentage fee structure is used, if the manufacturer sets a higher retail price, he also has to pay a
larger amount as fee to the e-tailer, which leads to a downward pressure on prices. In other words,
the problem of double marginalization is reduced in the case of agency selling, and the channel is more
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ecient as compared to the reselling agreement. If there were no spillover eects, the e-tailers would
always prefer the agency selling format.
When faced with spillovers, the incentives of the manufacturer and the e-tailers are further mis-
aligned due to another reason. This is because the manufacturer wants to maximize prots keeping
both channels (electronic and traditional) in mind, whereas the pure-play e-tailers want to maximize
the prots they derive from the electronic channel alone. In the case of a negative cross-eect of e-
channel sales on traditional channel sales, the manufacturer has the incentive to limit e-channel sales.
Therefore, if a reselling agreement is chosen, the manufacturer will set a high wholesale price for the
e-tailer which, in turn, will lead to higher retail prices and limit the negative spillover into the traditional
channel. However, this implies that the double marginalization problem will worsen in the e-channel.
Therefore, the e-tailers have the incentive to choose agency selling which increases channel eciency,
as discussed above. In addition, the e-tailers can also charge lower fees for access to the marketplace,
which gives the manufacturer greater incentive to sell through the e-channel. Therefore, if e-channel
sales have a negative cross-eect on traditional channel sales, the e-tailers will prefer agency selling.
When e-channel sales lead to a positive cross-eect on traditional sales, the manufacturer has the
incentive to increase e-channel sales through lower e-channel prices. In the agency arrangement, the
manufacturer has control over the retail price, and will charge a retail price lower than the ecient
retail price of the e-channel. This reduces the e-tailers' realized fees as well, and hurts their prots.
On the other hand, in reselling, not only do the e-tailers control the nal retail price, the manufacturer
is willing to charge lower wholesale prices to the e-tailers to keep retail prices low. Therefore, if the
spillover eect is positive and large, the e-tailers prefer the reselling agreement.
Finally, when the spillover eect is positive and medium, the channel structure is mixed, which
is surprising because ex-ante symmetric e-tailers use asymmetric channel structures. In the mixed
structure, the agency format maintains eciency, while reselling format prevents retail prices from
going too low in the e-channel.
To summarize, depending on the cross-channel eect (which determines how the manufacturer will
respond in prices), the e-tailers either prefer to have a more ecient vertical channel by using agency
selling, or have increased pricing power by using reselling.
The results in Proposition 1 are consistent with observed selling formats in certain industries. Specif-
ically, we nd that agency selling should be preferred under a negative or small positive cross-eect.
In the travel industry, where we can expect a negative eect on traditional sales (e.g., sales through
travel agents or hotels) as online sales increase, we see that most online travel sites such as Expedia
and Travelocity have agency selling agreements with airlines and hotels, which set retail prices. In
the case of books, where the cross-eect is small positive (Hilton and Wiley, 2010), our model again
predicts that we should observe agency selling, which is indeed the format used by competing e-book
stores run by Amazon and Apple. On the other hand, we nd that reselling should be preferred under a
positive cross-eect. In industries such as music, where there are strong stimulation eects (e.g., more
song and album sales lead to more revenues to artists from other channels, such as more airplay and
concert collections), we observe that most online music stores, e.g., iTunes and Spotify, have a reselling
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agreement with artists and record labels.9
We now discuss how the selling formats in the e-channel vary with the intensity of competition in
the market. In the presence of competing e-tailers, an advantage of agency selling is that retail prices
are jointly set for both retailers by the manufacturer, which cushions competition at the retail level. In
addition, the e-tailers are Stackelberg leaders in the market, which gives them more control over the
channel. Thus, we expect to see that as competition increases, agency selling will be preferred more by
both e-tailers. In Figure 3, when  takes medium and large positive values, we see that as the value
of the competition parameter  increases, the e-tailers prefer to adopt the agency conguration. (For
negative and small positive values of  , the e-tailers are already in the agency conguration for all values
of .) We state this result in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 As competition in the market increases (i.e.,  increases), the e-tailers' preferences
shift from reselling to agency selling. If the spillover is suciently positive, as competition increases,
the e-tailers switch from the RR arrangement to the RA and the AA arrangements.
We contrast this result with the results in McGuire and Staelin (1983) and Jerath and Zhang
(2010). In our case, as competition increases, there is a shift away from reselling and towards agency
selling. In McGuire and Staelin (1983), where competing manufacturers decide the channel structure, as
competition increases, the manufacturers choose reselling (or, in their terminology, vertical separation).
In Jerath and Zhang (2010), where a monopolistic retailer decides the channel structure, as competition
increases, there is a shift away from the store within a store arrangement (which is the brick-and-mortar
analogue of agency selling). Thus, our result complements the ndings in these papers.
Interestingly, under conditions of moderate spillover, we see a hybrid channel structure even though
the e-tailers are ex-ante indistinguishable. Choosing two dierent retail formats also helps reduce the
competition between the e-tailers,10 and they make more prots than they could have if they had both
chosen the same retail format. Not only does the reseller (e-tailer X) face a lower wholesale fee, but
the agency seller (e-tailer Y) can also charge higher agency fee. (This explains why the manufacturer
never prefers the hybrid arrangement, a fact we use in the next section.) Therefore, when the spillover
is moderate, we see an asymmetric conguration in the e-channel.
3.3 Beneciaries Under Agency Selling
The agency selling format confers dierent powers to the manufacturer and the e-tailers under dierent
conditions, and its adoption might lead to gains or losses for the players in comparison to the reselling
structure. Given that the retailers decide the equilibrium selling formats, is the manufacturer always
worse o under the equilibrium selling formats in the e-channel?
9We note that these industries have complicated market structures and our model is a simplication. Nevertheless,
these examples do oer directional support for the insights from our model.
10Note that the hybrid channel structure is not seen when there is no market competition, i.e.,  = 0, and it gains
more prominence as the market competition increases. This points to the fact that the emergence of this arrangement in
equilibrium is driven by competitive forces.
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Figure 4: Manufacturer's preference for agency selling
The manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader in the reselling arrangement as it decides the wholesale
prices rst, while it is a Stackelberg follower in the agency arrangement as the e-tailers decide the agency
fees rst. Therefore, generally speaking, the manufacturer prefers the reselling arrangement. However,
in the presence of spillovers, the manufacturer wants to control the nal retail price in the e-channel,
which implies that it has a preference for agency selling. Specically, when the spillover is positive,
the manufacturer gains more by having pricing power in the e-channel so that he can keep the price
low to stimulate demand in the traditional channel and, therefore, he prefers agency selling to reselling.
For a fraction of this region, the e-tailers also prefer agency selling to reselling because the gains from
channel eciency are enough to compensate for the loss of pricing power. In this situation, marked by
Region I in Figure 4, the manufacturer and the e-tailers receive the highest payo in the agency (AA)
conguration as compared to any other conguration. Furthermore, in our model, consumer welfare
is greater when higher quantities are sold in the market, which happens under the agency structure.
Therefore, all market participants are better o with the agency structure under the conditions marked
by Region I.
In the other regions in Figure 4, the equilibrium channel outcome is not what the manufacturer
prefers. In Region II, the manufacturer prefers the agency (AA) structure but a hybrid structure is
observed in equilibrium. (As discussed in the previous section, the manufacturer never prefers the
hybrid channel arrangement.) Incidentally, if conditions in the e-book market resemble the market
conditions in this region, this might provide an explanation for publishers' insistence for Amazon to
adopt an agency selling format when Apple introduced agency selling in the iBook Store.
3.4 Agency Fees under Equilibrium
Agency selling in online marketplaces is a new retailing innovation, which is only partially understood
by the industry. In this section, we provide some guidelines for setting fees under agency selling. (Note
that, in this section, we analyze the fee for all combinations of values of  and  , irrespective of whether
or not agency selling will be practiced in equilibrium.) Specically, we address how various factors such
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Figure 5: Changes in AA, the fee under agency arrangement (AA) with changes in spillover eects ().
as spillovers and competition aect the agency fee that an e-tailer should charge.
Proposition 3 In the AA conguration, the fees charged by the e-tailers are non-monotonic in  . As 
increases from its lowest possible value of  1, fees increase up to the value of  at which (1+AA 2) =
(1  AA)AA holds. Beyond this value of  , the fees decrease in  .
The plot of AA is shown in Figure 5. When the e-channel has a negative cross-eect on the
traditional channel, the manufacturer is cautious of selling too much in the e-channel. With a strong
negative cross-eect, the e-tailers need to oer incentives to the manufacturer to sell online instead
of selling through the traditional channel. They achieve this by setting a low agency fee so that the
manufacturer makes a higher prot per item sold through the marketplace in comparison to the loss
incurred in the traditional channel due to this sale (i.e., due to  lower sales). As  increases and
the negative cross-eect reduces, the e-tailers need to oer smaller incentive to the manufacturer to sell
through the marketplace, therefore the fee increases in  . As  increases further and becomes suciently
positive, the manufacturer now cares more about the stimulation of demand in the traditional channel
than the revenues from the e-channel. In this case, the manufacturer can reduce prices in the marketplace
to stimulate demand through the traditional channel which would result in a loss of revenue for the
e-tailer oering the marketplace. Therefore, the e-tailer decreases the fee so that the manufacturer gets
a bigger share of the revenues, and does not decrease retail prices in the marketplace as much.
To summarize, the fee is small for a strong negative cross-eect because the e-tailer wants the
manufacturer to sell more quantity through the marketplace, it is small for a strong positive cross-
eect because the e-tailer wants higher prices to be charged in the marketplace, and for intermediate
cross-eect values the fee is larger than at the extremes.
We now study the eect of competition on the fee. It is natural to assume that the e-tailers would
reduce the fee with increase in competition. However, we see that under some conditions the fee might
actually increase with the degree of competition.
Proposition 4 In case of negative cross-eect ( < 0), the fee charged under agency selling always
decreases in . In case of positive cross-eect ( > 0), the fee rst increases and then decreases in .
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Figure 6: Changes in AA with market competition ().
The above proposition shows that the relation between the fees charged by the e-tailers and the
competitive intensity in the market () is mediated by the cross-channel spillover eect (). The
rst part of the proposition states that if  increases, competition in the market increases. The e-
tailers compete for the manufacturer's business and they need to decrease the fee to incentivize the
manufacturer to use their marketplace. This is the eect for  < 0.
The second part of the proposition, which states that for  > 0 the fee, AA, rst increases and then
decreases in , is the more interesting case. This pattern is shown in Figure 6. This non-monotonic
nature of AA can be explained if we consider the impact of the positive spillover from the e-channel
to the traditional channel. It is clear from the demand system that, as  increases, the sensitivity of
demand to own price (given by 1=(1   2)) increases. In addition, the potential market size, given
by 2(1=(1 + )), decreases. This implies that, all else equal, demand in the e-channel decreases as 
increases. Since  > 0, the manufacturer benets more from the positive spillover from the e-channel
to the traditional channel, than from the prots in the e-channel. The decrease in e-channel demand
hurts the manufacturer's prot and he reduces prices in the e-channel (as  increases) to mitigate the
fall in e-channel demand. The e-tailers foresee this drop in prices and respond by increasing the fees to
get a higher share of the reduced marketplace revenues. This explains why in the presence of positive
spillovers the e-tailers may increase the fee as competition between them increases. However, as 
increases further and becomes large enough, the basic eect of competition between e-tailers dominates
the eect described above and leads to an overall decrease in fees in .11
We note that the non-monotonic nature of the agency fee, AA, with respect to the parameters 
and  is preserved in the parameter space in which the AA arrangement occurs in equilibrium. This
can be easily veried by jointly viewing Figures 3, 5 and 6. Overall, the model predicts that the agency
fee depends on the nature of a particular industry (specically, competitive intensity and spillover from
one channel to the other) and should, therefore, vary across industries.
11RA (the agency fee in the hybrid case) changes in a manner similar to 

AA.
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4 Extensions
In this section, we extend our basic model in multiple ways. First, we consider a situation in which the
rm can benet from positive externalities from sales of the product and consider the impact of this
factor on pricing and channel structure. Second, we allow the manufacturer to optimally set price in
the traditional channel. Third, rather than assuming a one-directional impact of online sales on oine
sales, we allow both purchase decisions to inuence each other.
4.1 Positive Externality from Product Sales
In the analysis in Section 3, we nd that agency selling leads to lower prices than in reselling because it is
a more ecient selling format compared to reselling. This insight may seem contradictory to the pricing
practice observed in the e-book industry around the year 2010, where prices of e-books at Amazon
increased after Amazon switched from reselling to agency selling. However, the driving forces discussed
in our basic model are not inconsistent with this phenomenon. In this section, we show that such a
phenomenon can occur when we consider additional rm incentives, thus enriching the basic model.
The e-books industry has gone through many changes in the last decade and we do not attempt to
explain all the phenomena using our model. Therefore, for clarity, we rst describe the phenomena in
this industry that we address. Following this, we oer an explanation of these phenomena.
In the period around 2006-09, Amazon was using the reselling format for e-books and, in many cases,
was selling the e-books even below the wholesale price that it paid to publishers (specically, Amazon
charged a retail price of $9.99 for e-books whereas it typically paid publishers between $12 and $13 for
them (Rich, 2009)). To read the e-books, consumers had to purchase the e-reader Kindle, also sold by
Amazon. Notably, Amazon was making a healthy prot on Kindle. In other words, Amazon was selling
e-books at a loss while making a prot through the paired-up product Kindle. Not surprisingly, the
e-book publishers opposed Amazon's practice of systematically selling their e-books at very low prices
(because it hurt their pricing ability in other channels) (Meadows, 2009, Rich, 2009, Trachtenberg and
Blackstone, 2009). Then, in the early part of 2010, Apple released the iPad that, among other things,
served as an e-reader. Apple also sold e-books from publishers through an agency selling format. Due
to competition in the e-reader market (i.e., Kindle vs iPad), Amazon reduced the price of the Kindle
over a period of time; in November 2008, the Kindle was priced at $399 per unit, and by November 2012
the price had declined steadily to $79 per unit (Yarow and Angelova, 2011). Concurrently, Amazon
started moving increasingly to an agency selling setup for e-books, and also stopped selling e-books
below marginal cost. Put dierently,in contrast to its earlier strategy of using e-books as a loss leader,
Amazon was now using the Kindle as a loss leader and making a prot on e-books (Ludwig, 2011). We
now oer an explanation for these events.
In the scenario described above, before the launch of the iPad, the e-tailer's decisions are driven not
only by the prots obtained from the focal product (in this case, e-books), but also by the impact of
the sales of the focal product on other sources of prot in this case, protable Kindle sales. Therefore,
e-tailers may care not only about the prot generated from the product sales in the e-channel but
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also about the indirect incremental prots induced by these sales. The externalities might be driven
by several underlying factors such as increased sales of associated products or long-term benets of
increased market share. Below we show that simply adding these externalities to the basic model in the
Section 2 can explain the above discussed selling format choices and pricing decisions of e-tailers.
To incorporate positive externalities imposed by product sales, we modify the e-tailers' prot func-
tions in the following manner:
~CX = 
C
X + q
C
X and ~
C
Y = 
C
Y + q
C
Y ;
where the superscript C denotes a particular channel conguration (i.e., RR, RA, AR or AA) and   0
denotes the positive externalities from product sales for the e-tailers. Note that the externalities might
be asymmetric; however, the simpler case of symmetric externalities is sucient for us to develop the
key intuition. (For completeness, we present analysis for the asymmetric case in the Appendix.) The
solution procedure for this model is the same as that in Section 3. We now discuss the insights obtained
from this model.
Interestingly, if there is positive externality from product sales, situations can arise in which retail
price under reselling is lower than retail price under agency selling. The intuition behind this as follows.
When an e-tailer receives a positive externality from product sales, she has a greater incentive to
increase her sales, i.e., she wants to sell more with the externality than she would want to sell without
the externality, ceteris paribus. To sell more quantity, the retail prices charged to consumers must be
lower. Consider the two selling formats, agency selling and reselling. If the selling format is agency
selling, the e-tailer can decrease prices only by decreasing the agency fee she charges to the manufacturer,
so that the manufacturer in turn reduces the retail price. On the other hand, if the selling format is
reselling, the e-tailer can directly control retail prices which gives her greater exibility in lowering them
to drive demand.
As an example, consider an agency selling situation where the agency fee is zero and the price set
by the manufacturer under agency selling is exactly the same as the wholesale price he would have
charged under reselling. If the positive externality increases by a small amount, the e-tailer would want
to further reduce retail prices to increase sales. However, she cannot do anything to reduce retail prices
because the agency fee already equals zero and since the incentives of the manufacturer (who sets the
retail price in this arrangement) have not changed, he does not change the retail price. On the other
hand, in the case of reselling, the e-tailer can reduce the retail price by any desired amount to increase
sales and benet from the positive externality. Therefore, as shown by this example, with externalities
due to sales, the retail price under reselling can be lower than the retail price under agency selling.
The region where the retail price under reselling is lower than that under agency selling, as a function
of  and , is shown in Figure 7(a). We note that this is a departure from the result presented earlier
in Section 3, and this dierence arises due to the additional positive externality from sales that we
incorporate into the basic model in this section. Interestingly, for a suciently high level of externality,
in a reselling arrangement, the e-tailer might even reduce the retail price below the wholesale price
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(a) In the lighter region, retail prices
under reselling are lower than retail
prices under agency selling.
(b) Selling formats in equilibrium
Figure 7: Price comparison and equilibrium sales formats for  = 1.
oered by the manufacturer.12 This oers a possible explanation for why Amazon was selling e-books
below wholsale price in the reselling arrangement when Kindle prices were high, but swicthed to agency
selling, which also led to an increase in e-book prices, as Kindle prices reduced.
The equilibrium selling formats with positive externalities are shown in Figure 7(b). Comparing
with Figure 3, we see that the the agency selling format is more prevalent (the agency (AA) and hybrid
(RA) arrangements cover larger areas) while the wholesale (RR) arrangement is less prevalent. This
is because, in general, as explained earlier, prices are lower and sales are higher under agency selling,
which is to the benet of the e-tailers with positive externalities from sales. Interestingly, we see is that
for large negative  the RR arrangement prevails (whereas without positive externalities from sales, the
AA arrangement prevailed in this region). The reason for this change in equilibrium channel structure is
that a large negative eect on traditional sales from e-channel sales hurts the manufacturer. Under the
AA arrangement, the manufacturer sets the retail prices in the e-channel to be high to limit e-channel
sales, thereby limiting the negative eect on its traditional channel sales. However, the e-tailers want
high e-channel sales to benet from the positive externalities. Therefore, the e-tailers prefer to take
control of the retail pricing in the e-channel by adopting the RR arrangement for large negative  ,
and they charge a lower retail price than what the manufacturer would charge in the agency-selling
arrangement. The following proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 5 In the presense of positive externalities due to sales through the e-channel on the e-
tailer's prot:
(a) Prices under reselling may be lower as compared to prices under agency selling.
(b) For any value of , for large negative  , the wholesale (RR) arrangement emerges in equilibrium.
Before we conclude this section, we note that, in the long run, such a positive externality may reduce
12The level of externality that induces the e-tailers(s) to adopt this strategy is given by RR =
(1 )(1+)
3  and 

RA =
(1 2)(2+2 2RA)(2(1 )(1+) (2(1+) (3+))RA RA2)
2(1 RA)(6(1 RA) 2(6 (6 RA)RA))
, where RR and 

RA are the thresholds for the wholesale and
hybrid cases, respectively.
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in magnitude or altogether disappear, either due to market saturation or due to shrinking prot margin
from the complementary products. For instance, after the advent of the iPad and other e-readers in
the market, Amazon's prot margins for the Kindle have reduced signicantly, so that the positive
externality from Kindle sales has reduced. In this case, our main model in which e-tailers maximize
prot will be more relevant in determining long-run market outcomes. Nevertheless, it is useful to
understand the (short-term) impact of such externalities on market outcomes.
The main message of this section is the following. While agency selling incentivizes a lower retail
price due to channel eciency, this does not necessarily imply that retail price under reselling cannot
be lower. In fact, as the preceding analysis illustrated, if there are external inuences on the incentives
of the player who sets the retail price, then reselling could indeed lead to a lower retail price.
4.2 Endogenous Pricing in the Traditional Channel
In the analysis in Section 3, we assumed that the prices in the traditional channel are exogenously
xed. In this section, we introduce a pricing stage for the traditional channel which allows prices in the
traditional channel to be determined endogenously, and to depend on the outcome of the e-channel.
Suppose that in the traditional channel the manufacturer sells his product through a reselling ar-
rangement with a traditional retailer. He charges the traditional retailer a wholesale price wo and the
traditional retailer sets a retail price po. We assume that the demand function for the traditional channel
is given by qo = Q + qE   po. This is equivalent to assuming that the spillover from the e-channel
changes the base demand in the traditional channel (the base demand being given by Q+ qE). Solv-
ing for the optimal retail and wholesale prices set by the traditional retailer and the manufacturer,
respectively, we nd that the manufacturer's prot is given by
M =
( Q+ qE)
2
8
+ ME ; (5)
as derived in the Appendix. qE and ME are the quantity sold and the prot obtained, respectively,
from the outcome in the e-channel. The above expression implies that quantity sold in the e-channel
impacts the manufacturer's price and prot in the traditional channel, which, in turn, can aect the
equilibrium conguration in the e-channel. We solve for the equilibria in this scenario using backward
induction, and Figure 8 shows the selling formats observed in this case.
By comparing Figure 8 and Figure 3, we see that even when the prices in the traditional channel are
determined endogenously, we observe outcomes qualitatively similar to those described in Proposition 1.
Specically, we observe the agency structure for negative and small positive  , the hybrid structure for
medium positive  , and the wholesale structure for large positive  . The slight dierence is that a
smaller positive spillover () is sucient for the retailers to switch from an agency structure to a
wholesale structure.
It may be the case that costs in the traditional channel are higher, such that the retailer incurs a
marginal retailing cost and the manufacturer incurs a marginal production cost for goods sold via the
traditional channel. For example, in the case of a printed book, the manufacturer incurs a signicant cost
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Figure 8: Channel structure when the manufacturer sells through a retailer and the prices on the
traditional channel are endogenously determined ( Q = 4).
of printing it and the retailer incurs a signicant cost of stocking it in store. Incorporating these costs
does not change the results qualitatively. Furthermore, if the manufacturer sells directly to consumers
in the traditional channel (rather than through a retailer) and endogenously decides prices, our results
are again qualitatively unchanged.13 The main ndings of our model continue to hold even if the timing
of the game is changed, i.e., the price in the traditional channel are decided simultaneously or earlier
than prices in the e-channel.
4.3 Endogenous Consumer Choice Across Channels
In the analysis in Section 3, we assumed for simplicity that the magnitude of the cross-channel eect
(i.e., the eect of online sales on oine sales) is exogenous. Here, we model the cross-channel eect by
modifying the utility function of the representative consumer such that the quantities consumed in the
online and oine channels are decided jointly. Specically, we use the following consumption utility
function:
U(qX ; qY ; qT ) = qX + qY + qT   1
2
q2X  
1
2
q2Y  
1
2
q2T   qXqY + qEqT ;
where qE = qX + qY denotes the total quantity consumed in the online channel. In this utility speci-
cation, , the coecient of the term qEqT , is a measure of the nature and magnitude of the interaction
between the sales in the traditional channel and the sales in the electronic channel. If  > 0, then there
is complementarity between the two channels and if  < 0, then there is substitutability between the
two channels. Using the above, we obtain the following linear demand system:
qX =

(1 + )  1  
2
1   pX +
   2
1   pY   pT


;
qY =

(1 + )     
2
1   pX +
1  2
1   pY   pT


;
13In this case, the manufacturer's prot is given by ( Q+ qE)
2=4 + ME . On comparing this to (5), it is clear that the
results in the two scenarios will be qualitatively similar.
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(a) Equilibrium channel conguration (b) Variation of agency fee with  (c) Variation of agency fee with 
Figure 9: Illustrative gures for analysis with ndogenous consumer choice across channels
qT =

(1 +  + 2)  pA   pB   (1 + )pT


;
where 
 =
1
1 +    22 :
Given the above demand system, the model can be solved using the solution procedure in Section 3. The
analysis is analytically intractable, so we resort to a numerical solution. The equilibrium selling format
for dierent values of  and  is shown in Figure 9(a). It is clear on comparing Figure 9(a) and Figure 3
that the results for the equilibrium selling formats in the current model with endogenous consumer choice
across channels (where  > 0 denotes complementarity and  < 0 denotes substitutability between the
channels) are qualitatively the same as those in the main model with an exogenous cross-channel eect
(where  > 0 denotes complementarity and  < 0 denotes substitutability between the channels). In
other words, the results corresponding to Propositions 1 and 2 hold in this case.
Next, we show the variation of the agency fee with  in Figure 9(b). This gure corresponds
to Figure 5 (with  on the x-axis instead of ). It is easy to see that this gure is very similar to
Figure 5|the fee rst increases in  and then decreases. This nding is consistent with Proposition 3
in the paper.
Finally, in Figure 9(c), we show the variation in the agency fee with . This gure corresponds
to Figure 6. We observe that, if   0, the fee monotonically decreases in , and if  > 0, the fee
rst increases and then decreases in . In other words, the results of Proposition 4 are qualitatively
replicated.
The key dierence between the model used for this analysis and the main model is that, in the main
model, for simplicity, we had assumed an exogenous and unidirectional impact of online sales on oine
sales while here we develop the demand system from rst priciples. As shown above, the key insights
obtained from this extended model are the same as those obtained from the main model. This lends
condence to our results and shows that our main model is an appropriate and acceptable simplication.
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5 Discussion and Conclusions
In recent years, we have seen signicant growth in the use of agency selling in e-commerce across
industries. Given the proliferation of agency selling, there is a need to understand the conditions under
which e-tailers should adopt them, especially keeping in mind the impact of sales in the e-channel on
sales in traditional retail channels through which manufacturers also sell their products. In this paper,
we identify conditions under which agency selling should be used, and the implications of using them
on various market participants, i.e., competing e-tailers, manufacturers and consumers.
Our analysis suggests that agency selling is an ecient selling format, but whether an e-tailer
should use it or not depends on the extent of the demand spillover between the electronic channel
and the traditional channel, and on the level of competition between e-tailers. Specically, e-tailers
should use agency selling when spillovers from the electronic channel to the traditional channel are
negative, absent or small positive. This result is anecdotally supported by the observation that agency
selling is used by travel websites in the hotel industry (such as Expedia and Travelocity), where we can
expect a signicant negative eect on traditional sales (e.g., sales through travel agents) as online sales
increase. As another example, the spillover eect for books has been found to be small positive (Hilton
and Wiley, 2010), and large e-book sellers such as Amazon and Apple indeed use the agency model.
On the other hand, setting up marketplaces and using agency selling implies giving control over retail
pricing to the manufacturers. When sales in the e-channel have a large stimulation eect on sales in
the traditional channel, agency selling might be detrimental for e-tailers because manufacturers have
the incentive to reduce e-channel prices, which will reduce the e-tailers' revenues as well. In accordance
with this prediction, we nd that reselling is the dominant selling format used by online stores in the
music industry (such as iTunes and Spotify), where there are strong stimulation eects on oine sales
(e.g., more online sales of music singles lead to more sales of album CDs and concert tickets). These
examples lend anecdotal support to our results.
Furthermore, e-tailers have greater incentive to use agency selling when there is increased competition
in the market as they can control the market better by virtue of becoming Stackelberg leaders, and also
partially mitigate retail competition by allowing the manufacturer to jointly set retail prices across
competing e-tailers. Interestingly, we might notice a hybrid conguration in certain industries as the
e-tailers adopt dierent selling formats to moderate intra-format competition.
We also provide directions for setting agency fees. We nd that the fee in agency selling should
depend both on the competition in the market and on the spillover that the e-channel has on traditional
retailing. The fee charged for the use of the marketplace is small when the absolute magnitude of the
spillover is large. As this magnitude of the spillover becomes smaller, implying that there is a reduction
in the interaction between the two channels, the fee increases. Surprisingly, our model also shows that
the fee might not always decrease with competition. When the spillover is positive, the fee might actually
increase with increasing competition between the e-tailers due to the demand-stimulation eect.
Our model also provides some broader implications for the future of e-commerce. Currently, e-
commerce is a small fraction of overall retailing, and we can expect both a positive or a negative
spillover from online sales into traditional retailing. As e-commerce continues to grow, one can expect a
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negative spillover eect to dominate. In this case, our model predicts that we will see increased adoption
of agency selling by online retailers. Furthermore, our model also predicts that if e-commerce gets more
competitive over time, agency selling will increase.
We extend our basic model to assume that e-tailers may benet from positive externalities across
product sales. In this case, e-tailers may have the incentive to reduce prices to increase sales, while
sacricing direct prots from the focal product. When this holds, we nd that e-tailers may prefer the
reselling arrangement to maintain direct control over retail prices and reduce them appropriately to
increase sales. In this case, contrary to the result of the main model, retail prices in reselling may be
lower than under agency selling. This scenario with positive externalities provides an explanation for
why Amazon, which selles both e-books and the e-reader Kindle, preferred reselling with low prices to
agency selling when Kindle prices were high.
We assume in the model that the manufacturer directly sells through the e-tailers and the traditional
channel. This is indeed true for a number of manufacturers. For instance, many e-book publishers sell
directly on Amazon in agency selling and manufacturers such as Lee, Kate Spade, Burberry, US Polo
Association, Lacoste and Kimberly Clark sell directly on Amazon Marketplace. However, a large number
of sellers on Amazon Marketplace (and other e-tailing platforms) are not manufacturers, but are third-
party resellers themselves. In this case, the insights from our model would be valid as long as the
third-party reseller (i.e., the upstream agent) also sells in a traditional channel (which is indeed true for
many sellers), and there are demand dependencies between the channels.
Our approach has several limitations which provide interesting directions for future research. First,
we assume that rms do not explicitly inuence how sales in the online and oine channels inuence
each other. It might be interesting to ascertain under what conditions manufacturers would want to
promote complementarities between the two channels and under what conditions they would want sales
in one channel to reduce demand in the other. In a similar vein, when a manufacturer sells dierent
products, he can make decisions endogenously about which products to sell through dierent channels.
Future work can advance our research by micro-modeling these factors. Second, we nd that, under
some conditions e-tailers choose to not oer agency selling (in spite of their eciency) because in the
presence of cross-channel spillovers they do not want to give pricing power to manufacturers. This
indicates that e-tailers could benet from using agency selling if they could impose restrictions on the
retail prices that manufacturers charge. The \Most Favored Nation" agreement that Apple made with
publishers of e-books is an example of this (Palazzolo, 2013). Under this agreement, the publishers
could not sell the same e-book at another competitor at a price lower than at Apple's e-book store.
Another example is that Apple does not give complete freedom to publishers to set prices in agency
selling, and they can only choose from dierent pricing levels. In a similar vein, while Amazon uses
agency pricing for e-books, there is compelling evidence that it attempts to inuence the prices that
publishers can charge (Amazon Books Team, 2014). Studying such contracts in detail, which are similar
to vertical price restraints used when manufacturers control the channel (Mathewson and Winter, 1984,
1998), could be an interesting and important area for future research. Third, we have not modeled how
multiple manufacturers compete on retail marketplaces. This could be an interesting direction for future
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research. Fourth, we assume a particular order of moves for the players in the model that is reasonable
and justiable. However, variation in the order of moves is possible. We consider one such variation in
the timing of the game; specically, in the asymmetric arrangement in which one e-tailer chooses reselling
and the other chooses agency selling, we analyze the situation when the manufacturer is the retail price
leader. We nd that our main insights are robust and remain unchanged in this case, but there can
also be some interesting dierences in the outcomes. For instance, the asymmetric case does not occur
in equilibrium (more details are available in the Appendix). Future research can explore this in more
detail. Fifth, novel logistics-related agreements are being oered by e-tailers to manufacturers (such
as \Fulllment By Amazon," under which the manufacturer decides the retail price in the marketplace
but the e-tailer takes over logistics activities such as warehousing and delivery). Incorporating logistics-
sharing aspects into our framework might lead to interesting implications. In this context, it may be
important to model uncertainty in demand and understand how dierent risk-sharing characteristics of
the dierent selling formats impact the e-tailers' and the manufacturers' decisions.
E-commerce presents an exciting area of research, and we believe that this is the rst paper that
addresses the consequences of demand spillovers between the e-channel and the traditional channel on
the selling formats that emerge in electronic retailing. We hope that the ideas presented in this paper
motivate interesting future research.
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Appendix
A1 Proofs for Section 3
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
We use backward induction to solve for the equilibrium channel conguration. Firstly, conditional on
the channel structure (RR, RA, AA), we derive the equilibrium outcomes like the demand, retail prices,
wholesale price and agency fees using backward induction for a specic subgame. These outcomes are
presented in Section 3.1. Secondly, the equilibrium channel arrangement for every pair of  and  is
determined by solving for the Nash equilibrium (NE) of the 2 2 game presented in Section 3.2. Note
that, without loss of generality, we assume that Y uses agency selling in the RA conguration. Solving
for the NE, the platform arrangement (AA) is observed when AAX  RAX , the hybrid arrangement (RA)
when RAX  AAX and RAY  RRY and the wholesale agreement (RR) when RRY  RAY . It is easy
to see that these conditions are mutually exclusive and there is a unique equilibrium channel structure
for every pair of  and . Since RA is not analytically tractable, we resort to a numerical analysis to
derive the equilibrium conguration presented in Figure 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
In order to show the variation in the platform fee w.r.t.  , we rst compute the derivative of e-tailer X's
prot w.r.t. the platform fee (dAAX

dX), and then equate the fee charged by both e-tailers because
of the symmetric equilibrium, which gives
dAAX
dX

X=Y =
=
(1  )3 +   2 + 2 2 + (1  )(2 + )  (1  )2( + 2)
4(1  )3 ( 1 + 2) :
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Let () =
(1 )3+( 2+2)2+(1 )(2+) (1 )2(+2)
4(1 )3( 1+2) : The F.O.C. implies that (

AA) = 0 . Using
implicit dierentiation, we get
@AA
@
=  @
@

@
@AA
=
2(1  AA)
 
AA
2 +    2   AA(   )
 
2(2 + AA)  32

2 + (1  AA)2AA2 + 2AA2   2
:
Substituting the optimal fee (AA) in this equation, it is easy to show that the denominator is always
greater than 0 for the domain of parameters, which implies
@AA
@  0 if  
AA(1 AA)
1+AA 2 , and
@AA
@ < 0
otherwise. Let g() =
AA(1 AA)
1+AA 2 . The aforementioned conditions state that 

AA is increasing in 
when   g() and decreasing when  > g(). Using Banach xed point theorem, we can show that for
every , there is a unique  s.t.   g() 8    and  > g() otherwise. Hence, AA increases in
   and decreases thereafter.
Proof of Proposition 4
Following the previous proof, we implicitly dierentiate AA w.r.t.  which gives us
@AA
@
=   @
@

@
@AA
=
2(1  AA)
 
(1  2 + AA)  AA(1  AA)
 
2(2 + AA)  32

2 + (1  AA)2AA2 + 2AA2   2
:
As show in the previous proof, the denominator is always positive. Hence, the sign of @AA

@ depends
on the sign of the numerator. When   0, the numerator is always negative implying that AA is
monotonically decreasing in . For  > 0, @AA

@ > 0 when
  p(1  AA)2AA2 + 4(1 + AA)2   (1  AA)AA	 =2 , and @AA@  0 otherwise. We can
apply Banach xed point theorem, in the manner illustrated in the proof for Proposition 3, to show
that there is a unique  such that AA increases in    and decreases otherwise.
A2 Analysis with Asymmetric Externalities
In this section, we analyze a case where e-tailers are asymmetric in terms of the externalities from
product sales. We use the following prot functions for the e-tailers:
~CX = 
C
X + 1q
C
X and ~
C
Y = 
C
Y + 2q
C
Y ;
where the superscript C denotes a particular channel conguration (i.e., RR, RA, AR or AA) and 1
and 2 denote the positive externalities from product sales for the e-tailers. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that 1 > 2 and 2 = 0, i.e., only e-tailer X receives the positive externality. Under this scenario,
e-tailer Y cares only about prots through the e-channel, whereas e-tailer X cares about both prots
and sales. Dierent incentives drive dierent selling format choices by the e-tailers. This asymmetric
model is analytically intractable, so we derive the equilibrium conguration numerically. We present
the results in Figure A1 for 1 = 1; the insights are qualitatively the same for other values of 1 > 0. We
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Figure A1: Channel structure when only one manufacturer receives the positive externality (1 = 1; 2 =
0).
obtain the following proposition, which compares the equilibrium congurations in this case to those in
the case without externalities from sales.
Proposition Compared to the case without externalities from sales, for large values of  , agency selling
is more dominant, as shown in Figure A1. However, when the value of  is large negative, a hybrid
arrangement is observed in equilibrium, where e-tailer X is a reseller and e-tailer Y is an agency seller.
As we mentioned in Proposition 1, the primary reason for the emergence of the wholesale (RR)
arrangement for large positive values of  was the mis-alignment of incentives between the manufacturer
and the e-tailers| the manufacturer wanted to maximize sales on the e-channel to drive higher sales in
the traditional channel, whereas the e-tailers wanted to maximize their e-channel prots. The presence
of the positive externality from product sales aligns the incentives of the manufacturer and e-tailer X
as both of them want to maximize sales through the e-channel when  > 0. Therefore, in this context,
the value of reselling as a strategy for the e-tailer to solve the mis-alignment issue decreases. On the
other hand, for large negative values of  , the manufacturer needs a higher incentive to increase sales
on the e-channel. Since the agency fee under agency selling is already very low for these values of
 , the only way e-tailer X can incentivize the manufacturer is through a higher wholesale price under
reselling. However, since e-tailer Y's incentives have not changed, she continues to use agency selling.
Consequently, we observe the hybrid structure (RA) in equilibrium.
A3 Derivation of Equation (5) in Section 4.2
If the traditional retailer faces wholesale price wo and charges retail price po, her prot is R = ( Q +
qe   po)(po   wo). The optimal retail price is po = ( Q + qe + wo)=2 and she sells a quantity qo =
( Q+ qe wo)=2. The manufacturer's prot from both channels is thus M = ( Q+ qe wo)wo=2+E .
He sets a prot maximizing wholesale price given by wo = ( Q+ qe)=2 for the traditional retailer which
leads to an overall prot of M =
( Q+qe)2
8 + E .
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A4 Manufacturer as the Price Leader in the RA conguration
In Section 3.1.2, we had assumed the following timing in the RA channel structure: First, the e-
tailer willing to enter into an agency selling agreement announces the agency fee . Subsequently,
the manufacturer decides the wholesale price. Finally, e-tailer X and the manufacturer simultaneously
decide retail prices and then demand is realized.
Here, we consider a situation when the timing of the game is slightly altered. We assume that the
manufacturer is the price leader in the RA case. Specically, the order of moves is the following. First,
e-tailer Y declares the agency fee. Next, the manufacturer sets both the wholesale price (w) to be
charged to e-tailer X, and retail price (pRAY ) at retailer Y simultaneously. Finally, e-tailer X sets the
retail price. Note that in the original analysis both pRAX and p
RA
Y were decided simultaneously. In this
case, the manufacturer sets the retail price at Y before e-tailer X sets its retail price, which gives it
more market power. We use backward induction to derive the equilibrium outcomes. Given w and pRAY ,
e-tailer X sets a retail price equal to
pRAX =
1 + w   (1  pRAY )
2
:
Given , the manufacturer simultaneously decides the wholesale and retail prices, which are as follows:
w =
(1  )4(1  ) + 2(2  )(1  ) + 2   [4(1  ) + 2(2  ) + 2]	
(8(1  )(1  2)  22 ;
pRAY =
(1  )[4(1 + )(1  )  (4 + (3  ))]
8(1  )(1  2)  22 :
Subsequently, we derive the optimal fee () set by e-tailer Y. The optimal fee cannot be derived ana-
lytically (similar to the main model) and we resort to a numerical analysis.
Using the above solution for the RA conguration, and the results from the main paper for the RR
and AA arrangements, we solve for the equilibrium conguration. This equilibrium conguration is
presented in Figure A2.
Figure A2: Channel structure when the manufacturer is the price leader in the RA conguration.
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From the gure, we can see that our main insights from Section 3 continue to hold. However, the
hybrid conguration is no longer observed in equilibrium. Since the manufacturer is the price leader, and
hence has more market power, an e-tailer no longer has an incentive to adopt the reselling arrangement
in equilibrium when the competing e-tailer chooses the agency selling arrangement. Therefore, the
asymmetric outcome does not appear in equilibrium. In other words, the increased market power of
the manufacturer dominates the reduction in the retail-level competition (that results when one e-tailer
resells).
A5 Analysis with Alternative Demand Function
In this appendix, to address the concern that our results are not driven by the specic demand function
we choose in Equation (1) in the paper, we consider a demand system frequently used in the literature
(e.g., Raju el al. (1995)), i.e.,
qX = 1  pX + (pY   pX) and qY = 1  pY + (pX   pY ); where  > 0:
Note that as  increases, the level of competition in the market goes up and the consumers become more
sensitive to the price dierential between the two e-tailers. In this manner,  is analogous to  in the
original model, although they are on dierent scales| 2 (0; 1], whereas  2 (0;1).14 Furthermore,
the market size is constant in this formulation unlike in Equation (1) where the market size changes
with . In the subsequent discussion, we show that our major insights continue to hold even with this
general demand system and are not driven by our specic demand systems specied in Equation (1).
We continue to use the same timing of the game as presented in Section 3. The solution of the
channel game leads to the equilibrium channel conguration depicted in Figure A3(a). This gure
corresponds to Figure 3 in the paper. We can clearly see that Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold
qualitatively (with slight dierences in the exact shapes of the regions with dierent equilibria).
Next, we analyze the agency fee charged in equilibrium. We show the variation of the agency fee
with  in the Figure A3(b), which corresponds to Figure 5 in the paper. It is easy to see that this gure
is very similar to Figure 5. The fee rst increases in  and then decreases. This nding is consistent
with Proposition 3 in the paper.
Figure A3(c), demonstrates the variation in the agency fee with  in the AA arrangement. The
gure corresponds to Figure 6 in the paper, and shows that the fee monotonically decreases in  when
  0, and rst increases and then decreases in  when  > 0. Therefore, Proposition 4 in the paper
continues to hold. This gure is very similar to Figure 6 in the paper. However, we do not see the
agency fee converging to 0, as  is small. For large values of , the fee converges to 0. (Note that large
values of  are similar to values of  close to 1.)
The above analysis shows that our results are not driven by our choice of the functional form.
14Loosely speaking, large values of  have a competitive eect similar to values of  close to 1. To see this, note that
the original demand function used in the paper can be written as qX =
1
1+

1  pX + 1  (pY   pX)

, and compare with
qX = 1  pX + (pY   pX).
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(a) Equilibrium channel congura-
tion
(b) Variation of agency fee with  (c) Variation of agency fee with 
Figure A3: Illustrative gures for analysis with the alternative demand system
Furthermore, this analysis also alleviates the concern that some of our results might be driven by a
decrease in market size (in the main model) as  increases. All our main results continue to hold even
when the market size is held constant indicating that the main forces driving our results are indeed the
cross-eect and e-tailer competition.
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